Beaten Down By Blood Page 28
On 31 August the 33rd Battalion on the Bouchavesnes ridge expended most of its ammunition and resupply was difficult, largely because of the terrain and the heavy German machine-gun fire. Fortunately, the men found 12,000 rounds of small arms ammunition that had been stored in a dugout since the March retreat and the use of rifles and captured machine-guns helped to conserve ammunition. This was a determining factor in the battalion’s ability to exploit its gains.24
In 1918 most transport was provided by horse-drawn wagons. Those men ‘fortunate’ enough to be in the transport section of their battalion were regarded as having an ‘easy’ job. However, maintenance of these transport lines was of enormous importance in supplying the front-line troops. It was essential that the horses were well cared for and this was far from ‘easy’. Australian divisions had between 2000 and 3000 horses on strength at any one time and it was crucial that there was sufficient forage, including hay, oats and green feed. During August and early September 1918 such feed was plentiful. However transport units could also come under direct fire and protecting the horses was difficult; they were often harnessed for long hours and cramped in sunken roads or old gun pits. The units were frequently shelled or gassed; the 19th Battalion war diary records that early in September both drivers and horses had to wear gas helmets on two occasions for the whole night.25
Speedily removed from the field
Efficient medical arrangements were particularly important to the men, who needed to know they had some chance of being taken out and treated if they were wounded. Their first port of call after walking from the field or being carried by a stretcher-bearer or German prisoners was the RAP, from which bearers would take them to a Ford car post, then to a heavy car relay which would transport them to the advanced dressing station where a competent staff of medical officers was available for urgent surgery. Further back was the main dressing station where surgical staff had more elaborate equipment. The next move would be to a casualty clearing station, then possibly to a hospital in France before they were transferred to a hospital in Britain. The seemingly complicated stages of this process were actually completed very quickly and, for the most part, without incident.
6th Brigade stretcher-bearers on the battlefield, 1 September 1918. (AWM EO3105)
On the Bouchavesnes ridge from 30 August to 2 September it was difficult to find the wounded on the battlefield. However, evacuations were conducted efficiently, often with prisoners carrying the wounded, and RAPs were well supplied with stretchers, 16 stretcher-bearers, dressings, splints, comforts and blankets. The 33rd Battalion’s RAP was located in a small dugout between Cléry and Road Wood on 31 August, four officers and 68 men of the battalion passing through, most with bullet wounds of a more serious nature than usual. Leslie Morshead praised the medical personnel for their work.26
The 10th Field Ambulance staffed the advanced dressing station for the 3rd Division at Curlu. This was located in huts formerly used by the Germans as a butchery. There were good roads in and out, plenty of floor space and dugouts in the vicinity.27 The space was needed because, on 31 August and 1 September, evacuations reached 500 a day, many of them 2nd Division men.
The main dressing station at Suzanne, with the 9th Field Ambulance in control, was situated in cellars and was well lit with ample accommodation. A walking wounded dressing station lay about 100 yards along the road in ‘a splendid room’ which the Germans had previously used as a bathhouse. There was a steady stream of patients and around noon on 31 August a temporary blockage in the evacuation of stretcher and walking cases occurred due to a shortage of cars and buses. Empty ammunition lorries were used to transport three loads of walking wounded. Finally, more cars arrived and the blockage was cleared, although plenty of fresh cases continued to pour in, including a number of Germans from the 2nd Guard Division. On 1 September there were further difficulties with cars, congested roads and the long distance to the casualty clearing station. During the day, 545 cases were admitted, including 103 wounded Germans and many 2nd and 5th Division men. All cases were cleared by 7.00 pm, a tribute to the skill and organisation of the staff.28
While Edward Martin wrote that the wounded of the 5th Brigade ‘were speedily removed from the field’ on 31 August, this was not true in all cases as repeated messages calling for aid from the 19th Battalion attested.29 This was more to do with the nature of the battle itself, however, than any laxity on the part of the stretcher-bearers, who were formed into three squads — each with six stretchers and 12 blankets — for each battalion. Medical arrangements for the brigade were, in fact, extremely well organised — a tribute to the brigade staff — with RAPs and car-loading posts moving forward as dictated by the movements of the battalions. On 31 August a Ford loading post was established next to the RAPs of the 17th and 20th battalions just south-east of Cléry, from which wounded men were taken to a Daimler car post on the western outskirts of the village before being transferred yet again to the advanced dressing station, first at Herbecourt and then at Feuillères, where the 5th Field Ambulance had established it in a wooden hut. Despite heavy casualties there was no confusion in evacuating the wounded. The bold use of Ford cars worked well under arduous conditions and the essential telephone communications between the dressing stations and the casualty clearing station were generally well maintained.30
The 10th Field Ambulance near Curlu, 1 September 1918. (AWM EO3209)
Men of the 6th Field Ambulance passing through Cappy on their way to the dressing station there, 29 August 1918. (AWM EO3130)
It was more difficult for the 5th Division to evacuate its wounded because of the condition of the bridges surrounding Péronne and many 14th Brigade men were sent out through the 2nd Division area using stretcher relays, which worked well. Those driving ambulances had to be flexible, changing posts and routes as the occasion demanded. Roads were battle worn and difficult to navigate. On 2 September, with a traffic bridge established near Halle, the evacuation route was shortened and the movement of casualties became easier.31
At the advanced dressing station at Herbecourt, manned by the 15th Field Ambulance, men were treated, rested and given warm refreshments before being sent to the main dressing station. No cases were held at the advanced dressing station for more than one hour. All worked efficiently, with plenty of blankets, stretchers and other necessities. The centre had three Ford and nine Sunbeam ambulance cars, nine horse-drawn ambulance wagons and three motor buses at its disposal. On 1 September two more large rooms were made ready to hold 100 patients, primarily to cope with gas cases.32 The Germans shelled the advanced dressing station during the evening on both 31 August and 1 September and, although no casualties were suffered, the telephone line was cut for some time.
The main dressing stations for the 2nd and 5th divisions were established at Cappy and staffed by the 6th Field Ambulance and the 14th Field Ambulance respectively for the operation at Mont St Quentin-Péronne. On 31 August medical personnel pitched two operating tents and prepared two rooms for gas cases. A dental unit was located nearby. The centres were well equipped with medical stores and equipment for the use of the forward units which could receive them quickly. From 31 August to 3 September the majority of stretcher cases brought through the 6th Field Ambulance were severe, with an extraordinarily high percentage of officers, particularly on 31 August. On 2 September the 14th Field Ambulance had to erect additional marquees and increase the number of motor ambulances and lorries to cope with the rush of wounded.33
One of the most innovative medical developments of the war was the expert Corps Resuscitation Team located at Cappy. From 30 August to 3 September it dealt with 23 cases ranging from the very serious to the desperate. This was cutting edge medicine dealing in resuscitation and transfusion with operations performed under gas-oxygen anaesthesia. Most men sent on after treatment had good prospects of recovery; without it they would have died. However, it was still a long way to the casualty clearing station — 14 miles as the crow flies, but more by ro
ad in a trip that took five and a half hours. On 2 September the 5th Casualty Clearing Station was established at Proyart, cutting the travelling distance by half and increasing men’s chances of survival. This centre catered in particular for life-threatening fractures and chest and abdominal wounds.34
Stretcher-bearers of the 6th Field Ambulance carrying the wounded from the main dressing station at Cappy to a waiting motor ambulance for movement to the casualty clearing station, 2 September 1918. (AWM EO3137)
It is not surprising that the Australians won at Mont St Quentin-Péronne despite the risks Monash took in committing tired and under-strength divisions to take formidable strongpoints without the usual complement of mechanical resources. While this was ultimately an infantryman’s battle and acknowledged as such by all the commanders — who themselves had done so much to create this fine fighting force — the contribution of the other arms, artillery, airmen, engineers and signallers, all interlocking and working together with the infantry, cannot be overlooked. All arms were supported by a logistical organisation which filtered down from corps level and did much to sustain the morale and fighting spirit of the troops. This was the Australian Corps at its very best, as its units had to improvise and adapt to the demands of the quick attack in order to seize victory. Charles Bean justifiably commended Monash’s ‘tactical ingenuity’ and free, flexible manoeuvre, implemented by his subordinate commanders and the troops they led.
CHAPTER 12:
A STRANGELY ISOLATED EVENT
When Monash took over as corps commander in May 1918, he was critical of the lack of ‘press’ the Australians had received. Their achievements tended to be lumped in with those of the British forces. He likened them to sportsmen, and commented that ‘no man will go on playing any game unless he can see his scores placarded on the scoring board’.1 Thus, he considered it important for morale — and perhaps his own prestige — that Australian victories in 1918 were recognised as such.
Consequently, the battle of Mont St Quentin-Péronne received more press coverage, both in Australia and internationally, than any other previous or indeed subsequent operation, representing a ‘publicity coup’ for the AIF and Monash in particular.2 Newspaper articles tended to stress the ‘heroic’ elements of the battle — never the tactics or use of firepower — and were written in ‘Homeric’ style, thereby helping to create the legendary status of the battle at the time. In Peter Stanley’s words, the battle ‘soon became swathed in the cocoon of myth and exaggeration which so often envelops the high points of a nation’s war history.’3 Bean accused Monash of a desire to have ‘the fighting written up with a lavish hand – not too much accuracy’.4
Common to almost all of the articles was a description of ‘the old world town of Péronne and the fortress of Mont St Quentin’, the former with its ‘gables and steeples’ and the latter with its ruined houses and ancient brick wall, the whole ‘bristling with machine guns’. Emotive terms such as ‘honour’ and ‘glory’ were frequently used to describe the motivation of the Australians and their ‘spirit’ was revealed in dramatic actions such as crawling forward on their stomachs and rushing in with bombs and bayonets. The Germans shelled the ground ‘vindictively’, but the Australians retained their humanity, lighting their pipes, writing their letters, playing cards and boiling their small dixies. They stuck by their mates with grim determination as ‘the little woods were running red’. One enormously exaggerated article in The Age claimed that ‘Péronne was in flames’ and the Australians ‘prepared their hearts for sublime suicide’ as they tore up their letters and flung the pieces to the winds so that no vital information would fall into German hands as they went forward to attack Mont St Quentin on 31 August.5
From the Scarpe to the Somme.
Charles Bean refused to play this game, incurring Monash’s anger as a result. He would not validate the legendary overtones of the battle, not wishing to subscribe to what he saw as propaganda and Monash’s ‘obsessional desire to claim battle honours’.6 So his dispatches, sent to newspapers such as the London Times, the Melbourne Age, the Sydney Daily Telegraph, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Hobart Mercury, were short and understated, revealing little about the capture of Mont St Quentin. While he gave the entry into Péronne slightly more coverage, Bean showed more interest in the capture of the Chuignes gun, blood transfusions and Prime Minister William Morris Hughes’ idea to send 1914 men home to Australia on leave.7
Bean’s relations with Monash were strained to breaking point in August/ September 1918 and this obviously coloured his judgement. In his diary entry for 4 September, Bean wrote that ‘the attitude of John [Monash] and Rosenthal and those of their type seems to be to suppose that the Germans are being shattered by our constant blows; that at each stage we Australians have forced him to retire from a position he meant to make permanent; and that we must go on delivering these blows as often as we can get the troops fit to make them.’8 A little later, in a rather disparaging comment, Bean remarked that Monash portrayed every bit of fighting as vital, revealing his own doubts not only about the conduct of operations but also their worth.
In later years, Bean was less critical of Monash, although he remained unconvinced of the value of Mont St Quentin-Péronne. While treating the battle in detail in the Official History and giving due credit to the men themselves, he believed that Ludendorff ordered a withdrawal of his troops to the Hindenburg Line on 2 September after the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant position further north, the loss of Mont St Quentin and Péronne only a secondary consideration.9 The Australians may have fought ‘heroically’, but for no purpose other than to boost Monash’s prestige, a fairly cynical and clinical interpretation of the battle.
Later historians such as Barrie Pitt and Denis Winter unequivocally regarded the battle as unnecessary. Winter dismissed it in a single sentence, noting simply that the Germans were about to withdraw which, of course, was not their intention at all.10 Pitt provided a more lucid explanation based on tactical considerations: the British Third Army was already east of Bapaume; the Canadians with the First Army broke through the Drocourt-Queant position further north, both advances thus outflanking the Mont St Quentin-Péronne position from the north, and the 15th Australian Infantry Brigade would outflank the position from the south by crossing the Somme south of Péronne. This was not, however, as events unfolded.11
Douglas Haig was not particularly interested in Mont St Quentin and Péronne at the end of August 1918. In another of those ‘switches’ which characterised Allied strategy since Amiens, by 25 August the focus had shifted away from the Fourth Army which was now instructed to ‘mark time’ and await the outcome of events elsewhere. The operation to be conducted by the British First Army was the priority of effort. Haig considered this a crucial operation, its objective to pierce the formidable Drocourt-Queant Line, a northern extension of the main Hindenburg system in front of Arras and part of the German ‘winter line’. If all went well, the First Army would capture the German supply depots around Marquion, east of the Canal du Nord, and the Cavalry Corps, with some infantry, would exploit this success by swinging south-east to cut off the German retreat. With the operations of the British Third Army in front of Bapaume, the line of the Somme would be turned from the north. Haig was hoping for a decisive breakthrough; the objective, a very ambitious one, to reach a line from Cambrai to St Quentin with the main sector of operations stretching from the Scarpe to the Somme, thus outflanking Mont St Quentin and Péronne and making the German positions there untenable.
What became known as the Battle of the Scarpe began on 26 August with the Canadians spearheading the advance with massive artillery and air support and a fair complement of tanks. Initially the attack made good progress, with the Canadians capturing the strong point of Monchy-le-Preux and overrunning a number of minor fortification lines.
However, the First Army assault began to slow in the face of strengthening resistance, uncut wire and extremely heavy casualties sustained by the C
anadian and British forces. The opportunity for a ‘decisive stroke’ quickly faded. By 29 August Lieutenant General Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps commander, had halted the attack in order to regroup and reorganise his battered troops and concentrate on minor engagements to improve their positions. He issued new orders on 31 August for the assault on the main Drocourt-Queant position to be launched on 2 September.
At the same time, the Third Army, spearheaded by the New Zealand Division, had taken Bapaume on 29 August using an encircling movement which forced the Germans to retire from the town. Believing it to be only lightly held, it took the New Zealanders five days and four attacks using tanks to capture Bapaume. By 2 September the line was only about three miles to the east of the town, with the high ground still held by the Germans, who now abandoned the position and surrendered en masse. It had been a bloody encounter in which the New Zealanders had suffered over 3000 casualties. By 1 September British troops were 1000 yards east of Bullecourt — the Australians’ nemesis in 1917 — and in position to support the right flank of the Canadian attack on 2 September.
That Haig was concerned about the success of the First Army operation is evident. It had not moved as quickly as expected and he was worried that the BEF would lose the initiative against this sector of the German ‘winter line’, accusing the Canadians of ‘stickiness’ when they stopped fighting to regroup. On 30 August Haig advocated taking ‘full risks in our forthcoming operations’, although by 1 September pessimism had replaced this early enthusiasm and, supposedly owing to a shortage of manpower, he told General Sir Julian Byng, commander of the Third Army, that he ‘was opposed to doing more attacking than was absolutely necessary’, biding his time ‘until the Americans can attack in force’. Pressure was mounting from the War Cabinet and, on 1 September, Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, advised Haig not to attempt the attack on the Drocourt-Queant position unless success was guaranteed.12 There were no such guarantees, and already Haig had revised his ideas of a cavalry breakthrough that would bring the Germans to their knees.